Welcome friends!
I had a few additional thoughts about those distributional issues I raised in my last post so maybe this time out we can do yet another follow-up post. Sorry about that. But that’s half the fun of talking things out, right? The way one thing leads to another?
My additional thought was that last time when I said I doubted anyone could take seriously the sort of utility discussed within economic theory and hence within conservative social philosophy I may have failed to take into account the potential differences in the fundamental moral senses of liberals and conservatives. I probably should have said I doubted any liberal could take that sort of utility seriously because upon further reflection it occurs to me maybe some conservatives do. The reason I think so is it seems to me an important difference in the fundamental moral perspectives of liberals and conservatives involves the degree to which we are all the same or different. Most liberals, starting from the belief that at some level we’re all pretty similar, would naturally recoil from any ethical theory implying the desires of any one person should dominate those of everyone else. Many conservatives, on the other hand, starting from a conviction vast differences exist between people, may very well not have the same reaction.
Now you may have noticed that in our society, as in most societies relying mostly on a market based system of allocating resources, the most trivial material desires of the wealthy outrank even the most desperate needs of the poor. I suppose that rather unsightly phenomenon must be one of the great underlying ethical issues of our age. Is it a problem or isn’t it? Hmm, well, that’s a tough one. You can probably guess which way I lean but I do appreciate there are a lot of issues involved and I’m certainly not going to resolve those issues today. In this post I would simply like to point out if one were to wholeheartedly support the status quo, as many conservatives are wont to do, then one would need some sort of ethical proposition implying there is something pretty special about rich folk that renders this result morally acceptable no matter what ethical theory one may choose to adopt. I’ve mentioned before there are plenty of different approaches one might take to attaching the necessary significance to the desires of rich people. One might talk about the issue in terms of their rights or their merit or what have you. However, if one were going with a utilitarian framework then I suppose one’s concept of utility would have to allow that rich people’s desires might just be associated with a lot more utility than those of other people. In other words, it occurs to me the distinctive type of utility used in economic theory is probably the only type of utility that would make utilitarianism palatable to many conservatives.
When it gets to the close intellectual relationship of economists and conservatives the interesting wrinkle that has always fascinated me is that although economists espouse the requisite form of utility they back away from actually arguing fulfilling rich people’s desires generates more utility than fulfilling the desires of other people. No, economists are satisfied to step back and say merely that fulfilling the needs of rich people may be associated with greater levels of utility or may not. Now as I’ve suggested before this would obviously be a troubling result for anyone who really took this form of utilitarianism seriously because it implies one cannot address any of the potentially ethically troubling situations involving conflicting needs, wants, and desires, such as occur for example in the distribution of resources. Indeed, one could only invoke one’s utilitarianism when thinking about one person in isolation which, of course, is a situation I think many people probably suppose doesn’t really require any ethical theory at all. That would be a rather funny form of utilitarianism, wouldn’t you say? I suppose if that were the type of utilitarianism one really supported then at the very least one would have to come with some additional ethical propositions to handle all the ethically significant cases involving resolving conflicting desires. Otherwise we’re talking about a whole lot of indifference. (For the economically literate note we would be talking not only about indifference between Pareto optimal outcomes but also between a Pareto optimal outcome and any non-Pareto optimal outcome that implied a different distribution of resources because one could never know if the associated costs were worth it or not. Pretty much the only conclusion one could make would involve moving between a given non-Pareto optimal outcome and a Pareto optimal outcome implying the same distribution, in which case one would obviously do better with the Pareto optimal outcome.)
You may have noticed that neither conservatives nor economists espouse quite the level of indifference one might reasonably expect a serious supporter of the relevant form of utilitarianism to demonstrate. Indeed, quite the contrary. Most of them tend to get rather agitated if anyone mentions anything having to do with redistribution. I think it’s reasonable to suggest something else must be going on. However, I suppose we shouldn’t be too hasty in our speculations about what that something may be. The possibility I concentrated on last time was that conservatives and economists don’t sincerely endorse the relevant form of utilitarianism at all but instead support the status quo distribution on some unexpressed and entirely different ethical basis and only talk about the particular form of utility they talk about because doing so displaces discussion of other conceptions of utility that other people, such as liberals, might find more ethically compelling. However, after thinking about it a bit more I now wonder if perhaps I was being a little too cynical. I suppose another possibility is at least some conservatives actually do sincerely support this form of utilitarianism but because of its limited practical significance they augment that theory with some unrelated ethical premises just to get them where they need to go. Like what you ask? Well, at the very least I suppose one would need to attach some independent value to upholding the status quo to escape the anomie of complete indifference. You know, if we can’t tell what we have stinks or not we should just keep it because it’s what we have. That sort of thing. It’s fine in isolation I suppose but a little awkward if you’re trying to discuss things with someone holding an ethical theory that does have implications for resolving interpersonal conflicts. Basically you’d be saying something along the lines of my own ethical theory implies I don’t know what would be better but in such situations I give precedence to the status quo and it doesn’t really matter to me how you or anyone else thinks about it or that your suggestions are just as likely as not to improve matters even under my own underlying ethical system. It’s a little weird if you think about it. I guess one must just really love that status quo. Of course, one might always go further and add any number of value premises to address the many situations in which the necessary information on utility is not forthcoming. Actually I suppose the need for additional value premises is much the same as last time. If one restricts oneself strictly to the type of utility used in economics one can’t really can’t say much about anything at all. Should we stay or should we go? I don’t know. What’s changed is in this case I’m suggesting conservatives might be holding these additional value premises in addition to the relevant form of utilitarianism rather than instead of the relevant form of utilitarianism as I postulated last time.
Figuring out if any economists and conservatives sincerely support the type of utility we’re discussing here is obviously an enormously difficult task because of course one can’t just walk up and ask them. At least that’s been my experience. With conservatives it’s all about misdirection, bait and switch, double meanings, false leads. Honestly, it makes one’s head spin. However, here’s a simple thought experiment that might work. You’re familiar with thought experiments in the context of ethics, right? You imagine a counterfactual state of the world to isolate the implications of a given ethical proposition and see how you feel about it. So let’s see. Imagine you lived in the first half of the twentieth century. In Germany. (Why? Because it’s easy.) Let’s say you were omniscient so if something existed then you knew all there was to know about it. Yes, you were very special. Indeed, you even knew the amount of utility (as conceived of by economists) different people derived from fulfilling their desires. One day you considered the case of that great bugbear himself, Adolph Hitler, and you discovered he was one of those superconductors of utility that is allowed for under the type of utility discussed within economic theory. Indeed, you determined that fulfilling his preternaturally strong desire to kill off various groups of people generated higher levels of utility than the combined utility that would be generated by fulfilling his victims’ desires to survive. So would it have been socially optimal to maximize utility in this case? Would it have been ethical to get behind Hitler and support him in his famous struggle? In other words, would Hitler have been in a comparable situation to rich people whose trivial desires trump the more vital desires of poor people because (maybe) they just get a lot more utility from fulfilling their trivial desires? Yes? OK, well then you do indeed have a sincere interest in the form of utility discussed within economic theory. I’m sorry I doubted you. No? That’s basically the case I discussed last time. If you’re not really interested in maximizing that type of utility then you shouldn’t talk as though you are. Someone will think you’re up to something. Can’t say / won’t say / situation is logically impossible? Hmm. Yeah, I’m not sure you think utility actually exists. Forget about the supposed difficulties in measuring or inferring utility, I think you must be using utility as just a funny way to talk about your perspective on the ethical implications of allowing a single person in isolation to do what he or she wants. In that case you could do us all a big favor and just talk a little more clearly. Don’t blather on about utility. Just say what you think and maybe add something like, look I’m not interested in resolving situations involving people with conflicting desires. That’s not what I’m talking about. I don’t have any opinion on how that should play out. Or, if you do want to address those issues then just talk about whatever values you’re using to address those situations.
I know what you’re thinking: conservatism is complicated, isn’t it? Sometimes I wish they could just talk plainly and honestly about they believe. But what would be the fun in that?
